* * *
It is important that we distinguish two challenges: one is
the question how the European Union should respond to the actions of the
current Hungarian government (I insist on the importance of choosing words
carefully here: the problem is not ‘Hungary’, but a particular set of
politicians and their disregard for the rule of law. Remember how Wolfgang
Schüssel and others managed to convince practically everyone that in 2000 we
were witnessing ‘sanctions against Austria’ — as opposed to bilateral measures
designed to express concerns about the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition). The other
challenge is how to devise, for the long term, a new set of institutions or
‘mechanisms’ to respond to deteriorations of democracy and the rule of law in a
Member State. Both challenges can be looked at from at least two crucial,
but in the end clearly different perspectives. One is a practical one:
what is deemed politically feasible and what is likely to be effective in
changing the conduct of a Member State government? The other one is more
clearly normative: what can be justified from a, broadly speaking, liberal
democratic perspective? How can one ensure that responses to violations
of the rule of law are not themselves in danger of looking like arbitrary ad
hoc measures (again, a complaint that was often voiced against the EU-14 by the
Austrian government in 2000 – and not entirely without reason)? The
latter peril is already pervasive in today’s EU because of the Eurocrisis – and
the danger of a Europe of permanent exceptions should not be compounded.