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A few years ago I was at a transatlantic policy event in
Washington, DC. It was the height of the Eurozone’s sovereign debt and
banking crisis and there was palpable fear that that the Euro would
crumble. If the ten year old currency union were brought to its knees, it
would be the result of a near-fatal one-two-punch. The hard left-cross
had been delivered by the profligate budgetary policies in the so-called
“crisis countries.” And the match-ending right-handed uppercut had come
in the form of Germany’s almost-genetic revulsion towards monetary solutions in
the face of debt difficulties.
There was very real concern that Europe’s dreadful handling
of the crisis might have devastating
economic effects around the world. It was clear, however, that no
proper conversation about the crisis could go forward without taking account of
the role played by the German Federal Constitutional Court. This bordered
on the bizarre for many of the Americans involved in the discussion. What
does a domestic court have to do with European policy, many wondered. And
for those more sensitive to judicial activism in general, it was a question of
the propriety of any role for any court in such high-stakes and
highly-technical matters. [continue reading here]
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